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This paper investigates the interplay between board-level 
governance characteristics, ownership concentration and firm 
performance in the Italian corporate landscape, which is 
characterized by high (though varying) degrees of ownership 
concentration. The empirical setting of this study is the Italian 
stock market and specifically a sample of non-financial firms 
included in FTSE MIB and mid-cap index of Milan stock exchange, 
spanning a five-year time period from 2011 up to 2015. We 
regressed an accounting proxy for firm performance, namely the 
return-on-asset (ROA) ratio, on several board-level governance 
variables and specifically board size, board independence, CEO-
chairman duality and audit committee (ACD) full independence. In 
doing so, we also controlled for the impact of different levels of 
ownership concentration by partitioning the sample into firms 
with lower and-higher-than-median values of ownership 
concentration (OC). The empirical results indicate that board 
characteristics differently impact performance in firms with lower 
levels of OC compared to firms with higher OC. Specifically, in 
lower-OC firms, board independence and AC full independence 
have a negative impact, whereas CEO duality (either alone or 
interacted with board independence) has a positive impact on 
performance. Conversely, higher-OC firms benefit from a large 
board size and are negatively affected by AC independence, while 
the remaining variables are not significant. The key insight to be 
gained from our evidence is that the individual and interaction 
effects of board-level mechanisms may be contingent on the 
presence of other governance mechanisms (in this instance, the 
degree of ownership concentration). As such, this research adds to 
the existing literature questioning the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach 
to corporate boards. In terms of practical implications, our 
findings support the notion that firms might consider the 
potential interaction and substitution effects between governance 
mechanisms and structure boards accordingly. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The linkage between corporate board structure and 
firm performance has been extensively researched 
over recent decades (e.g.: Arora and Sharma, 2016; 
Ben Barka and Legendre, 2016; Darko et al., 2016; 
Malik and Makhdoom, 2016; Pérez-Calero et al., 
2016; Mishra and Kapil, 2017). Much scholarly 
research has relied on three main theories to predict 
the performance impact of different board 
characteristics, namely agency theory, stewardship 
theory and resource dependency theory. 
Agency theory is indeed the most influential 
theoretical perspective in corporate governance 
research. Under its tenets, the board of directors is 
primarily viewed as a (monitoring) mechanism to 
address the potential conflicts between managers 
and shareholders (Type I agency problem) or 
between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Type II agency problems). This, in turn, would result 
in superior firm performance by reducing agency 
costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). 
The prevailing agency perspective on board 
governance is also reflected in governance reforms 
implemented in different countries which 
consistently recommend such mechanisms as board 
and committees independence as well as CEO-
Chairman separation as a means to foster the 
monitoring role of boards. 
Stewardship theory provides an alternative 
framework which de-emphasizes the monitoring and 
stresses the advice-and-counsel function of board 
members. Under this theory, managers and directors 
are not self-interested agents but rather good 
stewards of corporate assets who strongly identify 
with their organizations and thus personalize 
organizational failure and success, which makes 
monitoring redundant. Accordingly, it is argued that 
firms with more inside directors will achieve 
superior performance on the grounds that insiders 
have a better understanding of the business 
processes relative to outsiders and therefore make 
superior decisions (Donaldson, 1990; Klein, 1998). 
By the same token, CEO duality is assumed to be 
beneficial to firm performance due to the benefits 
associated with a unified leadership and goal 
alignment. 
Eventually, under the resource dependency 
perspective, the notion is stressed that boards have 
(also) the role of securing resources from the 
external environment especially in terms of outside 
linkages and networks of relationships, which in 
turn may benefit business development and its long-
term prospects (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
While much empirical work has been conducted 
based on these theoretical frameworks, the existing 
evidence is still inconclusive as research studies 
have provided mixed support for their predictions. 
Consequently, in recent years a more composite 
research perspective has developed which challenges 
the dominant perspectives on the board structure-
performance relationship, suggesting that the 
effectiveness of particular governance mechanisms 
(e.g. board independence) may depend on the 
presence (absence) of other governance mechanisms 
(e.g. ownership concentration) or the contextual 
setting under investigation. This approach 
commonly referred to as Contingency theory (Pye 
and Camm, 2003; Giovannini, 2010; Gaur et al., 
2015, Terjesen et al., 2016; Duru et al., 2016; Rubino 
et al., 2016; Zattoni et al., 2017) argues that the 
limitations of many prior studies based on dominant 
theories lie in that they tend to prescribe a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to board composition but fail to 
consider the potential interaction and substitution 
effects between governance mechanisms (Coles et 
al., 2001). 
The present study subscribes to this view and 
accordingly investigates the relation between 
internal (board-level) governance mechanisms and 
firm performance controlling for the impact of 
different levels of ownership concentration on this 
association. 
The empirical setting of this study is the Italian 
stock market and specifically a sample of non-
financial firms included in FTSE MIB and mid-cap 
index of Milan stock exchange, which comprise firms 
with the highest market capitalization. The Italian 
corporate setting is characterized by the presence of 
large controlling shareholders who dominate boards 
through influencing the directors’ nomination 
process as well as the board and committee agenda 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Other hallmarks of the 
Italian ownership context are the widespread 
perception of outside directors as lacking 
independence from management and the weak legal 
protection of small investors (Di Pietra et al., 2008, 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
Considering this ownership context and the 
resulting agency issues, we posit that different levels 
of ownership concentration may result in a different 
impact of board characteristics on firm 
performance. Specifically, our main variables of 
interest are board size, board independence, CEO 
duality, audit committee (AC) full independence. 
This latter variable appears of particular interest in 
the context of this study as the Italian Corporate 
Governance Code for listed companies centres the 
‘internal control system’, that is the oversight of 
financial reporting process and risk management 
practices, around the activity of the audit (and risk) 
committee (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Under this 
setting, independence is regarded as an important 
feature of audit committees in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of their monitoring role. 
Based on a sample of 230 firm-year 
observations, the empirical analysis indicates that 
board characteristics differently impact performance 
in firms with higher levels of ownership 
concentration (OC) relative to firms with lower-OC 
levels. Our main findings are as follows: first, board 
independence has a negative and significant impact, 
whereas CEO duality (both alone and interacted with 
board independence) has a positive and significant 
impact on performance (only) in lower-OC firms; 
second, board size positively impacts performance 
in higher-OC firms; and third, the impact of AC full 
independence is negative and significant for both 
higher and lower-OC firms. Overall the results of the 
empirical analysis provide scant support to an 
agency perspective on the relation between board 
structure and performance, whereas they appear 
more in line with the arguments of stewardship and 
resource dependency theory. 
This paper might contribute to the existing 
literature in the following respects. First, it provides 
additional evidence as to the effectiveness of certain 
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board properties and their impact on firm 
performance in a corporate setting characterized by 
large controlling shareholders; second and relatedly, 
it provides further support for the validation of a 
contingency model of board composition by 
documenting that the individual and interaction 
effects of board-level mechanisms may depend on 
other governance mechanisms at work (in this 
instance, the degree of ownership concentration). In 
terms of practical implications, our findings support 
the notion that firms might consider the potential 
interaction and substitution effects between 
governance mechanisms and structure boards 
accordingly (Coles et al., 2001). 
The paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents a review of the literature 
concerning the impact of board structure and 
ownership concentration on corporate performance 
and the related hypotheses are presented. Section 3 
describes the research design and the methodology. 
Results are presented in section 4, and finally, 
discussions and conclusions are presented in section 
 Section 6 discusses results and presents 5.
conclusions. Section 7 highlights limitations and 
avenues for further research. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The existing empirical evidence on the relation 
between board structure and firm performance is 
generally mixed and inconclusive (Dalton et al., 
1998; 1999; Minichilli et al. 2009). 
Some studies show that there is a positive 
relationship between board characteristics and firm 
value (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Kowalewski et al., 
2010; Maury 2006; Villalonga and Amit 2006; San 
Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada, 2012). However, 
other studies found a negative relationship between 
corporate governance variables and firm 
performance (Guest 2009; De Andreas et al. 2005; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
 
2.1. Board size 
 
The arguments and findings regarding the impact of 
board size on firm performance are conflicting; with 
the literature concluding that a large board size can 
have both positive and negative effects due to 
greater monitoring versus more rigid decision 
making respectively (Harford et al., 2008). 
One major advantage of large boards is the 
greater collective information that the board 
possesses about factors affecting that value of firms 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). Boone et al. (2007) 
confirm the hypothesis that large boards of 
directors are fully efficient in firms where a manager 
can adopt the fraudulent behavior, where the aim is 
to satisfy personal desires at the expense of 
shareholders. Studies by Harris and Raviv (2008), 
Jackling and Johl (2009), Abor and Biekpe (2007), 
and Kiel and Nicholson (2003) Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004), Anderson et al. (2004) and Pfeffer 
(1973) all found a positive relationship between 
board size and corporate performance. 
Ehikioya (2009) found a positive relationship 
between board size and return on assets. Similarly, 
Rubino et al. (2016) found a positive relationship 
between firm performance (ROA) and board size in 
non-family Italian firms. Eventually, Sheikh et al. 
(2011) find a positive relationship between board 
size and return on assets and earnings per share. 
On the counterpart, it is argued that larger 
boards may be more difficult to coordinate. This is 
arguably the reason why other research finds a 
negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. For instance, Conyon and Peck (1998) 
document that board size is inversely related to firm 
value in a sample of firms of European countries. 
Similarly, Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008), Yermack 
(1996) and Mak and Kusnadi (2005) found a negative 
association between large boards and firm value. 
Guest (2009) finds that board size has a strong 
negative impact on share return and Tobin’s Q. 
Generally, these researchers argue that large 
boards are associated with lower performance due 
to informational asymmetries, communication 
issues and slow decision-making processes (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). 
Considering the conflicting arguments and 
results on this issue, we propose the related 
hypothesis in the null form: 
Hp1. Board size has an impact on firm performance 
 
2.2. Board independence 
 
In these last few years, the academic community has 
focused much attention on the role of independent 
directors, especially in settings with concentrated 
ownership where an agency conflict may arise 
between large controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Guiterrez et al., 2012). 
Again the main theoretical perspectives used to 
explain how independent directors may affect firm 
outcomes are the agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stewardship theory. 
Under the agency-theory framework, 
independent directors have fewer potential conflicts 
of interest and can, therefore, provide greater 
integrity and offer impartial judgment on the work 
of managers thus reducing agency costs which in 
turn would prove beneficial to performance (Fama, 
1980; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997). As a matter of 
fact, much evidence exists that the presence of 
independent directors safeguards shareholders in 
the face of agency problems (Brickley and James, 
1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992). 
A second perspective on the issue is the 
resource-dependence theory which attaches much 
importance to the role of external resources in 
affecting firm performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
2003). Under this theory, the independent directors 
represent a human asset of immense value to the 
company (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), who can 
advise and support top managers (Minichilli et al., 
2009) bringing their experiences and different points 
of view. Furthermore, independent directors may 
expand their firms’ boundaries through providing 
linkages to important external resources (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). 
Both theoretical perspectives predict a positive 
impact of independent directors on performance. 
Alternatively, under the stewardship theory 
managers and directors are assumed to be good 
stewards of corporate assets who strongly identify 
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with their organizations and thus personalize 
organizational failure and success, which makes 
monitoring role of independents redundant. 
Furthermore, it is argued that inside directors being 
the organizational experts are in a better position to 
understand the business and make value-enhancing 
decisions on a range of issues (e.g. R&D spending) 
relative to independent directors who are often part-
timers to the firm in which they serve as directors 
and as such are not organizational experts. 
Consequently, they may not possess sufficient 
knowledge about the internal and external 
environment of the firm to make informed decisions 
and act in an advice-and-counsel function 
(Donaldson, 1990; Klein, 1998; Reibez, 2015). 
Against this theoretical framework, the existing 
evidence on the linkage between board 
independence and performance is somewhat mixed. 
So for instance, Brickley et al. (1997), Krivogorsky 
(2006), Florackis and Ozkan (2009), Luan and Tang 
(2007), Kim and Lim (2010), Jackling and Johl (2009) 
and Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) report a positive 
relationship between the presence of independent 
directors and firm performance. Most recently, Ben 
Barka and Legendre (2016) document a positive 
association between independent directors and 
financial performance as measured by ROA and ROE, 
in a sample of large listed companies indexed in the 
Société des Bourses Francaises. 
By contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Shan and McIver (2011), 
Terjesen et al. (2016) document a negative 
association between the percentage of independent 
directors and performance. 
Eventually Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Bhagat and Black (2002), Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998), Klein (1998), Arosa et al. (2010) and Rubino 
et al. (2016) find no relation between board 
independence and firm performance. Moreover, 
contrary to agency arguments, Klein (1988) finds the 
proportion of insider members on the board 
positively associated with various performance 
metrics. 
Considering these inconclusive and contrasting 
results, we propose the following hypothesis in the 
null form: 
Hp2.The presence of Independent directors on the 
board has an impact on firm performance 
 
2.3. Audit committee 
 
The audit (and risk) committee is viewed as an 
important internal mechanism of governance owing 
to its specific role of financial oversight and control. 
Its primary role is to oversee the financial 
accounting process so as to provide relevant and 
credible information to company stakeholders 
(Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Sun et al., 2014; 
Vafeas, 2005). More specifically, as far as the Italian 
(voluntary) regulatory framework is concerned, the 
audit committee is charged with the task of 
overseeing the accounting, financial reporting and 
risk management processes (Borsa Italiana, 2015). 
Similar to international trends, the Italian code of 
best practices recommends the audit committee be 
made of independent directors or alternatively of 
non-executive directors in majority independent. 
Independence is often described as one of the 
most important attributes of audit committees (AC) 
based on the assumption that the level of AC 
independence is associated with improved 
monitoring of the financial reporting and risk 
management processes (Klein, 2002). Evidence for 
this argument is provided by Carcello and Neal 
(2000) and Kamarudin et al. (2012) who document 
that independent audit committees are more 
effective at monitoring the quality of financial 
statements. Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2004) find 
a positive association between fully independent 
audit committees and the cost of debt financing 
suggesting that active monitoring of accounting 
process by independent directors is quite important 
from a creditor perspective too. 
In terms of performance impact, Chan and Li 
(2008) using a sample of Fortune 200 companies 
find a majority presence of expert-independent 
directors (i.e. who are top executives in other 
publicly traded firms) in the audit committee 
enhances firm value (Tobin’s Q). In a similar vein, 
Guo et al. (2014) document a positive association 
between firm valuation (M/BV) and the percentage of 
independent and professional directors in the audit 
committee among East Asian firms. 
However, there are also counter arguments that 
challenge the importance of AC independence. 
Contrary to the (agency) view that describes audit 
committees as overseers of management, hegemony 
theorists maintain that independent directors in the 
audit committee mostly act to ratify management 
actions. Under this view, even in fully compliant 
audit committees, independent directors would fail 
to question or act against the management (Cohen et 
al., 2008). Indeed, empirical evidence exists that ACs 
fail to deter earnings management practices (Wan 
Mohammad et al., 2016). Ben Barka and Legendre 
(2016) also document that a fully independent AC 
may be associated with lower firm performance. 
They explain this finding in terms of ‘reverse 
causality’, arguing that full independence of AC is 
achieved only when firms face financial difficulties. 
Since arguments and evidence on the effects of 
AC independence are mixed, we propose the related 
hypothesis in the null form: 
Hp3. A full independent AC has an impact on firm 
performance 
 
2.4. CEO duality 
 
CEO duality and its impact on performance is a 
highly contentious issue in both academic and 
business communities (Dalton et al., 2007; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009). Again, scholars make 
different assumptions about the performance effects 
of CEO duality with some relying on an agency-
theory explanation while others base their 
arguments on stewardship and resource dependency 
theory. 
Under the tenets of agency theory, the 
independence between the board and management 
is necessary to check managerial entrenchment 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Therefore, CEO duality would be detrimental to firm 
performance, essentially because it creates a strong 
individual power base, which could impair the 
board’s ability to exercise effective control on CEOs 
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(Peng et al., 2007). In other terms, CEO duality may 
constrain board independence and reduce its ability 
to exert an oversight and governance role (Finkelsten 
and D’Aveni, 1994; Millstein, 1992). 
On the contrary, scholars who rely on 
stewardship theory (Barney, 1990; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991) claim that shareholder interests are 
best served under a joint leadership structure. Here 
the assumption is that dual CEOs are motivated to 
act in the best interests of the firm by the intrinsic 
satisfaction that results from achievement, 
recognition, and reputation. This positive view is 
further supported by proponents of resource 
dependency theory who stress that dual leadership 
enhances managerial discretion which results in a 
greater ability to comply with a dynamic business 
environment and to secure critical resources. Studies 
show that CEO duality could be beneficial in terms 
of making optimal decisions (Ya’acoba, 2016; Yang 
and Zhao, 2014) and also in terms of financial 
reporting quality (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Uzun 
et al., 2004; Beasley, 1996). Furthermore, empirical 
studies such as Brickley et al. (1997) suggest that 
CEO duality is often the reward for good 
performance. 
However, the existing evidence is not always 
consistent with such positive view of CEO duality. 
Duru et al. (2016) find a negative effect of CEO 
duality on firm performance, though this effect is 
moderated (reduced) in the presence of higher board 
independence. In a similar vein, Combs et al. (2007) 
show that effective monitoring by independent 
boards coupled with powerful CEOs can serve as an 
important source of competitive advantage. 
Still, other studies such as Rubino et al. (2016) 
and Ben Barka and Legendre (2016) find no 
significant effect of CEO duality on firm value. 
Considering all the above, we propose the 
following hypotheses both in a null form: 
Hp4a. CEO duality has an impact on firm 
performance 
Hp4b. CEO duality moderates the impact of board 
independence on performance 
 
2.5. Ownership concentration 
 
The relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance has also attracted much 
research attention because ownership concentration 
is thought to be an effective monitoring mechanism 
reducing the likelihood of managerial opportunism 
and the related agency costs. According to agency 
theorists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) dispersed 
ownership structures give rise to conflicts between 
managers and owners, because managers who are 
assumed to be self-interested agents typically have 
much more information about the company than 
shareholders and can use their superior information 
to extract rents at the expenses of their principals 
(Type I agency problem). While dispersed owners 
have neither incentives nor means to monitor 
managers, concentrated owners have both means 
and motivation to discipline managers, with 
resulting beneficial effects in terms of performance. 
Concentrated owners can also use their knowledge 
and resources to enhance the resource endowment 
of firms (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2001). 
On the counterpart, ownership concentration 
may also result in (Type II) agency problems since 
controlling shareholders may expropriate non-
controlling shareholders by tunneling firm wealth 
through self-dealing or related party transactions, 
asset stripping and investor dilution (La Porta et al., 
1999.). When this is the case, ownership 
concentration can have a negative impact on 
profitability. 
Empirical evidence on the impact of ownership 
concentration is mixed. Moreover, many empirical 
studies focus on the conflict between unmonitored 
managers and dispersed owners which is typical of 
the Anglo-American context. For instance, Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) using data from 511 US firms find 
no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and accounting profit returns. 
However, in an often-cited study of 371 US 
companies, Morck et al. (1988) find a significant 
non-monotonic relationship between both ownership 
concentration and profit rates and ownership 
concentration and firm value (Tobin’s Q). One 
interpretation is that firm performance improves 
with higher managerial ownership, but beyond a 
certain threshold managers become entrenched and 
pursue private benefits at the expense of outside 
investors. 
Alternatively, Claessens et al. (2002b) 
investigate the relation between firm valuation and 
ownership structure in the context of public traded 
East Asian corporations which are mostly controlled 
by a single large shareholder. They find that firm 
value as measured by the market-to-book ratio 
increases with the share of cash flow rights in the 
hands of the largest shareholders. However, they 
also document that firm value falls when the control 
rights of the largest shareholders exceed his cash-
flow ownership, which provides incentives to 
expropriate non-controlling shareholders. 
Studies have also examined the relation 
between ownership concentration and performance 
in the context of small European capital markets. 
Among these latter are Kapopoluos and Lazaretou 
(2007) and Perrini et al. (2008) who use samples of 
Greek and Italian public listed companies (PLCs) 
respectively. Both studies document a positive 
association between ownership concentration and 
performance, thus supporting the notion that the 
higher the ownership concentration the more 
effectively manager behavior is monitored and 
disciplined, thus resulting in better performance. 
Additionally, scholars argue (Singh and Gaur, 
2009; Gaur et al., 2015) that higher ownership 
concentration make the monitoring role of corporate 
boards less important as ownership concentration 
reduces agency problems. An implication of this 
argument is that under concentrated ownership 
structures, the presence of internal members on the 
board may become more important relative to 
independence and other board-level mechanisms 
such as CEO-Chairman separation, essentially 
because agency problems are reduced and 
consequently boards would perform more of an 
advisory than a monitoring role. Consistent with this 
view, Gaur et al. (2015) find that in the presence of 
high ownership concentration, the presence of 
internal directors and CEO duality leads to superior 
accounting performance. 
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Based on these arguments, we explore whether 
the degree of ownership concentration acts as a 
contingency factor in the relation between board 
structure and performance. Therefore our fifth 
research hypothesis stipulates that: 
Hp5. The relation between board characteristics and 
performance is contingent on the degree of 
ownership concentration. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact 
of internal governance mechanisms on the financial 
performance of Italian listed firms. Specifically, we 
explore the performance impact of board size, board 
independence, CEO duality, full independent audit 
committees, accounting for the role of ownership 
concentration. 
For this research purpose, we use a sample of 
firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange in Milan 
spanning a five-year-period from 2011-2015. We 
exclude banks and other financial institutions 
because their governance arrangements are chiefly 
dictated by legal criteria (Giovannini, 2010). 
The final sample is comprised of 56 firms 
totaling up to 230 firm-year observations. 
We extracted data on firm performance and 
control variables from the AMADEUS database. Data 
on corporate governance were collected from the 
annual reports of sample firms retrieved on the 
‘investor relations’ section of their official websites. 
 
3.1. Dependent variable  
 
As a proxy for firm performance we use return on 
assets (ROA), an accounting-based performance 
measure which has been largely used in corporate 
governance research (e.g.: Galeotti, 2006; Easterwood 
et al. 2012; Terjesen et al. 2016; Sheikh et al., 2011; 
Duru et al., 2015; Pèrez-Calero et al., 2016; Ben 
Barka and Legendre, 2016). ROA is calculated as the 
ratio of net income to total assets. 
Hutchinson and Gul (2004) argue that use of 
accounting ratios are preferable to stock market 
ratios to investigate the relationship between 
performance and corporate governance since they 
best reflect management’s deviant behavior. 
 
3.2. Control variables 
 
We control for variables that have been shown to 
affect the governance-performance relationship 
(Dalton et al., 1998) and specifically firm size and 
leverage. 
Firm size (FIRM SIZE) is included in the analysis in 
order to account for any confounding effect it might 
have on ROA. Similar to prior research (Mishra and 
Mohanty, 2014) market capitalization is used to 
proxy firm size. 
Leverage ratio (Lev), as measured by the ratio of 
total debt to total assets (Firer and Stainbank, 2003; 
Duru et al., 2016), is used to control for the impact 
of debt servicing on profitability. 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Explanatory Variables  
 
The independent variables used in this study are 
board size, board independence, audit committee 
(AC) full independence, CEO-duality and an 
interaction variable between CEO duality and board 
independence. 
Board size (BOSIZE) is measured by the ratio of 
board members to the natural logarithm of total 
assets. 
Board independence (BOIND) is measured by 
the ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of board directors. 
AC full independence (ACFULLIND) is measured 
by a dummy variable which codes 1 if the audit 
committee is entirely composed of independent 
members and 0 otherwise. 
CEO duality (CEODUAL) is measured by a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the chair 
of the board and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. REGRESSION MODEL  
 
We run the baseline regression model (1) separately 
on two sub-samples. Specifically, we split 
observations by the degree of ownership 
concentration (OC) separating firms with higher-
than-median (> 0.50) from lower-than-median OC (≤ 
0.50). As in prior research studies (Allegrini and 
Greco, 2013), we measure ownership concentration 
by the proportion of ordinary shares held by the 
first largest shareholder. 
The reason for selecting this type of analysis is 
that we can thereby make direct inferences about 
the effect of ownership concentration on the link 
between board characteristics and financial 
performance by not including the ownership 
concentration variable directly in the model and 
thus avoiding potential endogeneity issues. 
The functional form of the regression model is 
as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑧 + 𝛽3 𝐵𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐷
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
+ 𝛽6𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 ∗  𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑈𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐷
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝜀 
(1) 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
sample firms in the time-period under investigation. 
In terms of board characteristics, the average board 
size is 10 with nearly 51% of board members being 
independent directors. The roles of board chairmen 
and CEO are combined in 23% of sample firms, and 
about 66% of them have a full independent AC 
committee. 
Referring to the findings of prior research on 
Italian listed companies (Ianniello, 2013), the average 
board size observed in this study is comparable, 
whereas the proportion of independent directors is 
higher and CEO duality is lower. This outcome might 
be partly due to sampling difference and partly to 
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increased compliance with the recommendations of 
Corporate Governance Code. 
The average percentage of shares held by the 
first largest shareholder is 0.47, which confirms that 
Italian listed firms are characterized by high (though 
varying) degrees of ownership concentration. 
Table 2 presents Pearson pair wise correlations 
for the dependent and independent variables. 
Correlation analysis is also helpful in detecting 
the presence of multicollinearity among explanatory 
variables. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std dev 
ROA  230 -.712 .356 .14344 .0996699 
1stSHAREHOLDER 230 .0558 .7889 .4776208 .1589614 
BOARDSIZE 230 5 15 10.23333 2.48989 
BOIND 230 .1818182 .8888889 .5074222 .1667151 
CEODUAL 230 0 1 .2333333 .4236593 
ACFULLIND 230 0 1 .6619217 .4738993 
LEV 230 0 1.49 .5510333 .3156836 
FIRM SIZE 230 .0940478 24.95704 20.62826 3.416584 
 
As shown in the table the inter-correlations 
among predictors range in absolute values from a 
low of 0.02 to a high of 0.506. According to Kennedy 
(1985), multicollinearity should be considered a 
serious concern only if the correlation between 
predictors exceeds 0.80. 
An additional test for multicollinearity was 
conducted by estimating the variance inflation 
factors (VIF), consistent with the study by Weisberg 
(1985). Again using a cut-off value of VIF = 5 (see 
Craney and Surles, 2003), no serious concern of 
multicollinearity among predictors was detected (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate a level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
5.2. Regression results 
 
Table 3 conveys the results of the regression 
analysis. Standard errors are computed using robust 
methods in which observations are clustered by 
firm. This allows us to exploit information in both 
the cross-sectional and time-series of data, 
controlling for the potential serial correlation in 
each firm’s time-series of observations (see Boone et 
al., 2007). 
 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable: ROA(ln) 
Panel A: Lower OC Panel B: Higher OC 
Coefficients t-values VIF Coefficients t-values VIF 
Cons -1.491738 -1.49  -4.725081** -6.40  
BOSIZE -2.326737 -1.43 1.35 2.178107 2.32 1.22 
BOIND -2.853472** -2.47 2.41 -3526163 -0.45 1.67 
CEODUAL 1.127275*** 4.02 5.40 0.1439636 0.60 1.17 
ACFULLINDEP -0.7419395* -1.81 1.38 -0.4299289* -1.75 1.34 
CEODUAL×BOIND 11.25952* 7.65 5.53 1.053722 0.68 1.66 
LEVERAGE -0.0175464* -5.28 1.59 -1.037644* -3.48 1.08 
FIRM SIZE 0.0698818** 2.06 1.43 0.0570129** 2.36 1.07 
R-squared 0.4213   0.2557   
F-statistic 8.01***   3.96***   
N. of observations 84   146   
Note: ***, ** and * indicate a level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Panel A and Panel B list the parameter 
estimates for lower and higher-OC firms 
respectively. For both sub-samples, the explanatory 
power of the model is relatively good with R-squared 
values of 0.42 and 0.25. However, results indicate 
that board attributes differently impact firm 
performance in lower-OC relative to higher-OC firms. 
Noticeably all the primary variables of interest 
except board size (p>0.10) have a statistically 
significant impact on performance in firms with 
lower levels of OC (specifically the coefficients on 
BOIND, CEODUAL, ACFULLINDEP and 
 
ROA(ln) 1st SH BOSIZE BOINDP CEODUAL AC FULLIND CEODUAL×IND LEV 
FIRM 
SIZE 
ROA(ln) 1 
    
c 
 
  
1st SH -0,0287 1 
     
  
BOSIZE 0,1221 0,0338 1 
    
  
BOIND -0,2025*** -0,0308*** -0,1692*** 1 
   
  
CEODUAL 0,0283 0,1690*** 0,0263 -0,3001*** 1 
  
  
AC FULL IND -0,2325*** -0,2345*** 0,1895*** 0,2904*** -0,0799 1 
 
  
CEODUAL×IND 0,0504 -0,1475*** -0,0460*** 0,4996*** -0,5062*** 0,0944 1   
LEV -0,3474*** -0,1931*** 0,0622 0,2917*** -0,1291** 0,2516*** 0,0532 1  
FIRM SIZE 0,1296** -0,1965*** 0,0328 0,1965*** -0,0352 0,1274** 0,0190 0.0759 1 
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CEODUAL×BOINDEP are significant at p<0.05, 
p<0.01, p<0.10 and p<0.10 respectively) while in the 
case of higher-OC firms only coefficients on BOSIZE 
and ACFULLINDEP meet a conventional level of 
significance (p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively). 
Overall these findings are consistent with our 
contingency argument (Hp5) that the performance 
impact of board attributes is dependent on the level 
of ownership concentration. Hence it appears that 
higher ownership concentration would serve as a 
substitute for governance mechanisms at board-
level. 
Also interestingly, the sign of coefficients on 
board independence and AC independence are 
negative while the sign on CEO duality is positive, 
which challenges the arguments of agency theorists 
who strongly advocate for outsider-dominated 
boards, AC independence and the separation of the 
CEO and chairman roles. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on the interaction term 
(CEODUAL×BOINDEP) has a positive sign indicating 
that a dual leadership structure has not only a direct 
effect on performance but also moderates 
(positively) the relation between board independence 
and performance. Possible explanations for all such 
findings are outlined below. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper supports a contingency perspective on 
the relation between board composition and firm 
performance and specifically explores the role of 
ownership concentration in affecting this 
connection. 
In terms of our research hypotheses, the main 
findings of this study may be summarized and 
explained as follows. 
As far as lower-OC firms are concerned, the 
coefficient on board size is negative and not 
statistically significant, thus Hp1 is not supported 
for this subsample. Diversely, the coefficient on 
board independence is negative and significant, thus 
verifying Hp2. This finding, backed by prior research 
(Gaur et al., 2015; Sheikh et al., 2013; Ehikioya; 2009; 
Chen et al., 2006; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, Coles et 
al., 2001; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996), is consistent 
with a stewardship theory perspective on board 
independence which argues against having outsiders 
on the board on the grounds that outsiders do not 
have enough knowledge of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the firms to serve in an advice-and-
counsel role (Davis et al., 1997; Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994). It is also consistent with the 
argument made by Gaur et al. (2015) that board 
independence is value-enhancing only when firms 
face agency problems and consequently a strict 
. With regard to oversight role by the board is needed
the third hypothesis (Hp3), we find a negative 
association between AC full independence and firm 
performance, thus Hp3 is supported. This finding 
challenges the (agency) view that an independent 
monitoring of the financial and risk management 
processes enhances firm performance, at least as far 
as accounting performance is concerned. We might 
tentatively explain this result by assuming that firms 
establish a fully independent audit committee when 
they face financial troubles as a means to comfort 
the markets and/or strengthen their internal audit 
and risk systems. Practically it might be an issue of 
reverse causality (Ben Barka and Legendre, 2016). In 
relation to the fourth hypothesis (Hp4a), we found a 
positive and statistically significant association 
between CEO duality and firm performance. This 
result runs counter the predictions of agency theory 
which argues that combining both roles into a single 
position weakens board control which, in turn, 
would negatively affect performance. It rather 
supports the predictions of stewardship theory 
suggesting that authoritative decision making under 
the leadership of a single individual leads to higher 
performance. Furthermore, this evidence is 
consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g.: 
Sheick et al., 2013; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Additionally, we found 
a positive and statistically significant interaction 
effect of CEO duality and board independence on 
performance, which verifies Hp4b. This finding 
supports the argument that effective monitoring by 
independent boards coupled with powerful CEOs 
can serve as an important source of competitive 
advantage (e.g. Combs et al., 2007). It is also 
consistent with prior works by Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) and Quigley and Hambrick (2012) 
which propose and support the hypothesis that the 
potential agency and inertial effects of legacy 
preservations costs associated with a powerful CEO 
may be mitigated by the vigilant oversight of 
independent members acting as stewards of 
shareholder value. 
Conversely, for firms with a higher ownership 
concentration, results change to a large extent. 
Specifically, the coefficient on board size becomes 
positive and statistically significant, which is in line 
with the findings of Lipton and Lorsch (1992), 
Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996) and Anderson and 
Reeb (2004). This can be explained under the tenets 
of resource dependency theory, which suggests that 
larger boards with a high level of links to the 
external environment improve provide firms with 
access to additional resources, which in turn 
positively influence firm performance. This finding 
corroborates prior evidence from the Italian setting 
casting doubt on the conventional view that smaller 
boards are the preferable governance structure 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). As far as the other 
variables of interest are concerned, the coefficients 
on board independence and CEO duality as well as 
the interaction term while keeping the same sign are 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level of 
confidence, indicating that: 1) board independence 
has no significant impact on performance 2) CEO 
duality has no differential impact on performance 
vis-à-vis a separate leadership and 3) does not exert 
any moderating effect on the relation between board 
independence and corporate performance. 
Accordingly Hp2, Hp4a, and Hp4b cannot be 
accepted for this subsample. A possible explanation 
is that under higher concentrated ownership 
structures these internal governance mechanisms 
become less important as the need for a strict 
oversight of management by independent members 
relaxes and other internal attributes take priority 
such as recruiting additional board members in an 
advisory capacity. This would also explain why 
board size is significant only for higher-ownership 
concentration and not for lower-ownership 
concentration firms. The only variable that remains 
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statistically significant is AC full independence, thus 
Hp4b is supported for higher-OC firms as well. 
 
7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIRECTIONS 
 
This research suffers from several limitations. First, 
despite the fact that the Italian corporate setting 
presents features that are common to some other 
European countries, it does not imply that our 
findings and conclusions are applicable to other 
national contexts especially those with different 
legal systems. Second, our analysis is restricted to 
the largest Italian listed companies; hence the study 
is biased towards this type of firms. Future research 
should extend to cross-national samples of firms 
and possibly to non-listed firms as well; moreover, it 
should verify if our results hold under different 
performance specifications such as market-based 
firm performance measures. Third, the empirical 
results may depend on the methodological choices 
in that we only distinguish sample firms by the level 
of ownership concentration, whereas other 
governance mechanisms such as the direct 
involvement and representation of owners at board 
level or the type of ownership (familial, institutional, 
State) may affect the relation between board 
structure and firm performance; furthermore future 
studies could augment our results by extending the 
analysis beyond firm-level contingencies to the 
external (macro-level) contingencies on which the 
relation between board attributes and performance 
may depend. For instance, a recent stream of 
research (e.g. Zattoni et al., 2017) has documented 
that the effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
developed at the firm level is contingent on the 
features of the national institutional environment. It 
implies that some institutions such as the efficiency 
of the judicial system (Lepore et al., 2017) or the 
financial structure of the economy (e.g. equity-based 
versus credit-based financing) can either increase or 
reduce the impact of internal governance attributes 
on corporate performance. Accordingly, future 
studies may explore the potential complementarity 
and substitution effects between firm-level 
mechanisms and country-level institutions (see 
Schiehll et al., 2014). 
Eventually, this study does not control for the 
potential endogenous relationship between board 
attributes and performance. The endogenous 
phenomenon is a reverse causality problem between 
board-level variables and performance. It implies 
that not only board attributes may impact 
performance but also (past) performance may 
impact board composition. As an example, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998) document that poor 
performance of a firm can result in the replacement 
of inside directors with outside directors on the 
board. Accordingly, the historically poor performing 
firms would have a higher proportion of outsiders 
on the board and audit committees. If such firms 
were part of our sample there might be a problem of 
endogeneity in the analysis which warrants further 
empirical probing in future research. A typical 
method to address this issue is via the use of 
‘dynamic’ panel data models such as the System 
Generalized Method of Moment (System GMM) which 
allows current values of explanatory variables to be 
influenced by past levels of firm performance (see 
Arellano and Bower, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
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